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George Ritzer
Department of
Sociology
University of
Maryland
College Park, MD
20783
ritzer@socy.umd.edu
wc: 1090
PARADIGM
A paradigm is a fundamental image of the
subject matter within a science. It serves to define what should be
studied, what questions should be asked, how they should be asked,
and what rules should be followed in interpreting the answers
obtained. The paradigm is the broadest unit of consensus within a
science and serves to differentiate one scientific community (or subcommunity) from
another. It subsumes, defines, and interrelates the exemplars,
theories, and methods and instruments that exist within it.
The most famous use of the paradigm concept is that of Thomas
Kuhn. As influential as the concept, and the theory of scientific
revolutions in which it is embedded, were, there is great ambiguity
in the way Kuhn used the concept. One critic found twenty-one different definitions in his
original work. This very ambiguity may have helped to make the
concept influential since it could be interpreted and used in many
different ways.
The definition offered above is consistent with at least one
of Kuhn’s definitions, his sense of a paradigm as what he called a
“disciplinary matrix”. Some take issue with this definition claiming
that the idea of a disciplinary matrix was an early
conceptualization and that later Kuhn defined paradigms as exemplars, that is, as
concrete solutions to scientific problems and puzzles. They have in
mind definitive laboratory experiments that serve as models for
scientists who work in a given tradition.
The later Kuhn did seem to want to restrict the paradigm
concept to concrete solutions to puzzles, but this idea works best
when applied to the hard sciences where breakthroughs in the lab do
serve as models for others. However, few social sciences have much
in the way of laboratory research. Exemplars, at least used in this
way, will not help us get a better sense of the structure of the
social sciences and the ways in which they change. Indeed, the
theory of scientific revolutions, of which the paradigm is a central
component, has little applicability to the social science where few,
if any, “revolutions”, at least in the Kuhnian sense, occur. Social
sciences may change dramatically and suddenly but it is rarely the
result of dramatic new laboratory developments.
For Kuhn, the dominance of a paradigm allows for “normal
science” as the paradigm is fleshed out (but not questioned in any
fundamental way). Change occurs as normal science leads to findings
that cannot be explained by the dominant paradigm. As these
anomalies mount, a crisis phase is reached and the science moves
toward a situation where a new paradigm can arise that will better
explain both what the old paradigm did as well as most, if not all,
of the anomalies. Once the new paradigm is in a position of
preeminence, the stage is set for the process to recur.
If, as is the case with the social sciences, there is no
dominant paradigm, but multiple paradigms, then the process
described by Kuhn is called into question. Anomalies require the
existence of an agreed-upon paradigm and without one it is hard to
see how anomalous findings will come about, let alone create a
crisis. Rather, the
crisis for the social sciences is the co-existence of multiple
paradigms in basic disagreement.
In the mid-1970's, when the paradigm concept was at the
height of its influence, sociology was characterized by three basic
paradigms–the “social facts”, “social definition” and “social
behavior” paradigms. These differed fundamentally in their image of
the subject matter of sociology with the social facts paradigm
focusing on large-scale social structures and institutions, the
social definition paradigm on the way people construct their social
worlds and act and interact on the basis of those constructions, and
the social behavior paradigm on behavior that is less dependent on
social constructions. Given these differences in image of the
subject matter, adherents of each paradigm have different exemplars,
here defined as orientations and bodies of work that serve as icons
and models for practitioners within each paradigm. To the social
factist it is the work of Emile Durkheim (who created the term
social fact), to the social definitionist it is that of Max Weber on
social action, and to the social behaviorist it is the work of the
preeminent psychological behaviorist, B.F. Skinner. Based on these
differences in image of the subject matter and exemplar, those
within each paradigm tend to develop and use different methods and
theories that fit best with that image of what is to be studied and
with the basic orientation of the exemplar. Thus, sociology tended
to be characterized by three distinct paradigms each with its own
set of images, exemplars, theories and methods. These paradigms
tended to be deeply at odds with one another, questioning each
other’s focus and most basic assumptions. This prevented researchers
from doing the normal science that is a prerequisite to the
development of a paradigm, to the uncovering of anomalies, and to
scientific revolutions.
Fields change and sociology’s paradigmatic status is quite
different today. The fortunes of extant paradigms wax and wane and
new ones come to the fore. In the case of sociology, it has become
harder to identify the leading paradigms with the result that the
field looks more chaotic that it did several decades ago. Yet, there
are disadvantages to the hegemony of a limited number of paradigms
(debilitating conflict over basic assumptions) and advantages to a
more chaotic science (scientists are less restricted by paradigmatic
allegiances). Thus, we must not simply assume that the decline in
paradigm hegemony, and the increase in chaos, is counterproductive,
especially for a field like sociology already characterized by
multiple paradigms.
The paradigm concept, and the theory of scientific
revolutions of which it is part, remains an important touchstone for
anyone interested in a better understanding of the structure of
scientific fields including, and perhaps especially, the social
sciences.
GEORGE RITZER, UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND,
COLLEGE PARK
REFERENCES AND FURTHER
READING
Eckberg, Douglas E. and Lester Hill. 1979. “The
Paradigm Concept and Sociology: A Critical Review.” American Sociological Review
44: 925-937.
Hoyningen-Huene, Paul. 1993. Reconstructing Scientific
Revolutions: Thomas S. Kuhn’s Philosophy of Science. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press.
Kuhn, Thomas. 1970. The Structure of Scientific
Revolutions. 2nd ed. Chicago: University of Chicago
Press.
Ritzer, George. 1980. Sociology: A Multiple Paradigm
Science. Rev. Ed. Boston: Allyn and Bacon.
Ritzer, George. 2001. “From Exclusion to
Inclusion to Chaos (?) in Sociological Theory.” In
George Ritzer, Explorations in Social Theory:
From Metatheorizing to Rationalization. London: Sage:
145-153.
SEE ALSO
Behaviorism
Social
Constructionism
Social
Facts
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